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Abstract: In this paper we show that the wildly popular Holt and Laury (2002) risk 
preference elicitation method confounds estimates of the curvature of the utility function, 
the traditional notion of risk preference, with an estimate of the extent to which an 
individual weights probabilities non-linearly.  We show that a slight modification to their 
approach can remove the confound while preserving the simplicity of the method which 
has made it so popular.  Data from a laboratory experiment shows that our new method 
yields significantly different levels of implied risk aversion than the Holt and Laury task 
even after econometrically controlling for probability weighting in the latter.  Implied 
risk aversion from the traditional Holt and Laury task is relatively insensitive to payout 
amount, but our new method reveals increasing relative risk aversion and risk neutrality 
at low payout amounts.   
JEL codes: C91, D81 
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1. Introduction 
The abundance of uncertainty in life has prompted a great many investigations into 
humans’ response to risk. The interest in understanding risk preferences has created a 
latent demand for effective, easy-to-use risk preference elicitation devises. Following a 
long line of previous research by Becker, DeGroot, and Marshak  (1964), Binswanger 
(1980; 1981), and others, in 2002 Holt and Laury (H&L) introduced a risk preference 
elicitation method that has subsequently become a mainstay.  In a testament to the 
general interest in risk preference elicitation and to the specific appeal of the approach 
introduced by H&L, their work has been cited more than 1,500 times according to 
Google Scholar and is the third most highly cited paper published by the American 
Economic Review since 2002 according to ISI’s Web of Knowledge.   
Although there have been a few quibbles over some of the details of original study 
(e.g., see Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and Laury, 2005), there has heretofore been little 
doubt expressed that the basic approach introduced by H&L can cleanly identify risk 
preferences. In this paper, we show that the H&L approach is subject to Wakker and 
Deneffe’s (1996) insight that many risk preference elicitation methods confound 
estimates of the curvature of the utility function (i.e., the traditional notion of risk 
preference) with an estimate of the extent to which an individual weights probabilities 
non-linearly. These are two conceptually different constructs that have different 
implications for individuals’ behavior under risk, and without controlling for one, biased 
estimates of the other are obtained.   
While it is possible to use data from the H&L technique to estimate these two 
constructs ex post, such econometric approaches require a number of implicit and explicit 
assumptions (including assumptions about the functional form of the utility and 
probability weighting functions, error structure, and extent of preference heterogeneity), 
any of which might produce misleading inferences about risk preferences. We show that 
with a slight modification to the original H&L method, one can remove the confound 
between risk preferences and probability weighting while preserving the simplicity of the 
method which has made it so useful and popular. Using results from laboratory 
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experiments, we show that at low payout amounts, the original H&L method suggests 
individuals are more risk averse than our new method, which removes probability 
weighting as a determinant of choice.  In fact, the new approach shows that people are 
essentially risk neutral over low payout amounts. When payouts are scaled up, we find 
increasing relative risk aversion in our new task, but constant relative risk aversion with 
the traditional H&L task.  Attempting to econometrically control for probability 
weighting in the H&L task does not yield the same implied risk aversion as our new 
method. 
In the next section, we illustrate why the existence of probability weighting could 
lead to misleading inferences about risk preferences using the H&L approach, and reveal 
our solution to the problem. Then, we discuss the psychological literature which suggests 
incentive-effects might affect probability weighting.  The following section outlines our 
new method and the experimental design. We discuss our results in the penultimate 
section and then conclude.     
 
2. Effect of Probability Weighting on Choice  
In the base-line treatment used by H&L, individuals were asked to make a series of 
10 decisions between two options: A and B (see Table 2).  In option A, the high payoff 
amount is fixed at $2 and the low payoff amount is fixed at $1.60 across all 10 decision 
tasks.  In option B, the high payoff amount is fixed at $3.85 and the low payoff amount is 
fixed at $0.10. The only thing changing across the 10 decisions are the probabilities 
assigned to the high and low payoffs.  Initially the probability of receiving the high 
payoff is 0.10 but by the tenth decision task, the probability is 1.0. The expected value of 
lottery A exceeds the expected value of lottery B for the first four decision tasks.  Thus, 
someone who prefers lottery A for the first four decision tasks and then switches and 
prefers lottery B for the remainder is often said to have near-risk neutral preferences. 
Analysts often use the number of “safe choices” (e.g., the number of times option A was 
chosen) or the A-B switching point to describe risk preferences and to infer the shape of 
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an assumed utility function (e.g., Bellemare and Shearer, 2010; Bruner et al., 2008; Eckel 
and Wilson, 2004; Glöckner & Hochman, 2011; Lusk and Coble, 2005 just to name a 
few).       
For simplicity and consistency with the H&L experiment, let p represent the 
probability receiving the higher payoffs in lottery options A and B, which are $2 and 
$3.85, respectively.  The probability of receiving the lower monetary outcomes, $1.60 
and $0.10 for options A and B, is thus (1-p).  Given the ample evidence (and theory) of 
non-linear probability weighting, e.g., Quiggin (1982) and  Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), we write the weighted utility of option A as: EUA = w(p)·U(2) + (1- w(p))·U(1.6) 
and option B as: EUB = w(p)·U(3.85) + (1- w(p))·U(0.1). The likelihood an individual 
chooses option A over B (i.e., the measure of the degree of risk aversion) is 
monotonically related to the difference in weighted utilities: EUA - EUB = w(p)·U(2) + (1- 
w(p))·U(1.6)- w(p)·U(3.85) - (1- w(p))·U(0.1).   
Because analysts typically use the number of A choices an individual makes as they 
move down the H&L table as a measure of the degree of risk aversion, and the 
probability of receiving the higher payout linearly increases as one moves down the table, 
we can ask how the likelihood of choosing option A over B changes with p: 
(1) ∂(EUA - EUB)/∂p = ∂w(p)/∂p·[U(2)-U(3.85)]+ ∂w(p)/∂p·[U(0.1)-U(1.6)]. 
Because, for any well behaved utility function, U(3.85)>U(2) and U(1.6)>U(0.1), the 
above derivative must be negative, which means that as one moves down the H&L table, 
they are less likely to choose option A and are more likely to choose option B.   
The key observation we make here is that the choice between options A and B in the 
ten H&L decision tasks, which is driven by the derivative in (1), is influenced by how 
people weight probabilities: ∂w(p)/∂p.  A number of experimental studies have estimated 
the shape of w(p), using functional forms such as w(p) = pγ/[ pγ + (1-p)γ]1/γ.  Estimates of 
γ typically fall in the range of 0.56 to 0.71 (e.g., see Camerer and Ho (1994), Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), or Wu and Gonzalez, (1996)), which implies an S-shaped probability 
weighting function that over-weights low probability events and under-weights high 
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probability events.  Only under the case where γ = 1 does w(p) = p, and it is only here that 
the derivative in (1), i.e., the switching point, is uninfluenced by probability weighting.  
Stated differently, the extent to which an individual weights probabilities non-linearly 
will, as shown in equation (1), drive when they choose to switch between options A and 
B, which is the key measure researchers typically use to make inferences about the 
curvature of the function U(x). Not controlling for w(p) may, therefore, provide 
misleading estimates of the curvature of U(x). 
To illustrate the problem more precisely, consider a simple example where 
individuals are risk neutral: i.e., U(x) = x.  With the traditional H&L task, a risk neutral 
person with γ = 1 would switch between options A and B between the fourth decision 
task, where EUA - EUB = 0.4·[2-3.85]+0.6·[1.6-0.1] = 0.16 and the fifth decision task, 
where EUA - EUB = 0.5·[2-3.85]+0.5·[1.6-0.1] = -0.175.  However, if the person weights 
probabilities non-linearly, say with a value of γ = 0.6, then they would instead switch 
from option A to B between the fifth decision task, where EUA - EUB = w(0.5)· [2-
3.85]+(1-w(0.5))·[1.6-0.1] = 0.108, and the sixth decision task, where EUA - EUB = 
w(0.6)·[2-3.85]+(1-w(0.6))·[1.6-0.1] = -0.066. Here is the key result: in the original H&L 
decision task, an individual with γ = 0.6, will appear risk averse even though they have a 
linear utility function, U(x) = x. The problem is further exasperated as gamma diverges 
from one.  Of course in reality, people may weight probabilities non-linearly and exhibit 
diminishing marginal utility of earnings, but the point remains: simply observing the A-B 
switching point in the H&L decision task is insufficient to identify the shape of U(x) and 
the shape of w(p). The two are confounded. 
Given the above set-up, one might ask if there is a simple way to avoid the confound.  
With a slight modification to the H&L task, one can eliminate probability weighting as an 
explanation for the switch between options A and B.  Indeed, looking back at equation 
(1), if probabilities do not change across decision tasks, then probability weighting cannot 
possible explain the switch. This is, in effect, our simple solution.  We modify the H&L 
task such that probabilities remain constant across the ten decision tasks and instead 
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change the dollar payoffs so that the switch from A to B can only be explained by the 
shape of U(x).      
 
3. Experimental procedures 
3.1. Description of the experiment 
A conventional lab experiment was conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007). Subjects consisted of undergraduate students at the University of Ioannina, Greece 
and were recruited using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). During the 
recruitment, subjects were told that they would be given the chance to make more money 
during the experiment.1 Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to generate samples 
that are less risk averse than would otherwise have been observed (Harrison et al., 2009). 
Subjects participated in sessions of group sizes that varied from 9 to 11 subjects per 
session (all but two sessions involved groups of 10 subjects). In total, 100 subjects 
participated in 10 sessions that were conducted between December 2011 and January 
2012. Each session lasted about 45 minutes and subjects were paid a €10 participation 
fee. Subjects were given a power point presentation explaining the risk preferences tasks 
as well as printed copies of instructions. They were also initially given a five-choice 
training task to familiarize them with the choice screens that would appear in the real 
task. Subjects were told that choices in the training phase would not count toward their 
earnings and that this phase was purely hypothetical. 
Full anonymity was ensured by asking subjects to choose a unique three-digit code 
from a jar. The code was then entered at an input stage once the computerized experiment 
started. The experimenter only knew correspondence between digit codes and profits. 
Profits and participation fees were put in sealed envelopes (the digit code was written on 
the outside) and were exchanged with digit codes at the end of the experiment. No names 
were asked at any point of the experiment. Subjects were told that their decisions were 
                                                            
1 Subjects were told that “In addition to a fixed fee of 10€, you will have a chance of receiving additional 
money up to 25€. This will depend on the decisions you make during the experiment.” 
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independent from other subjects, and that they could finish the experiment at their own 
convenience. Average total payouts including lottery earnings were 15.2€ (S.D.=4.56). 
 
3.2. Risk preference elicitation  
Our experiment entailed a 3x2 within-subject design, where each subject completed 
three different multiple price lists (MPL) at two payout (low vs. high) amounts.  As 
shown in Table 1, the baseline (or control) involved the original H&L task at their low 
payoff amounts.  
 
Table 1.  Treatments in experiment 
Payout 
Multiple Price List low(x1) high (x5) 
H&L Control Treatment 1 
Modified H&L with constant probabilities Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Modified H&L with non-linear probabilities Treatment 4 Treatment 5 
 
The baseline H&L MPL presented subjects with a choice between two lotteries, A 
or B, as illustrated in Table 2.  In the first row, the subject was asked to make a choice 
between lottery A, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €2 and a 90% chance of 
receiving €1.6, and lottery B, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €3.85 and a 90% 
chance of receiving €0.1. The expected value of lottery A is €1.64 while for lottery B it is 
€0.475, which results in a difference of €1.17 between the expected values of the 
lotteries. Proceeding down the table to the last row, the expected values of both lotteries 
increase, but the rate of increase is larger for option B.  For each row, a subject choose A 
or B, and one row was randomly selected as binding for the payout. The last row is a 
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simple test of whether subjects understood the instructions correctly.2 The first treatment 
(Treatment 1) is identical to the control (shown in table 2) except that all payouts are 
scaled up by a magnitude of five. 
 
Table 2. Original H&L Multiple Price List 
Lottery A 
 
Lottery B 
EVA (€) EVB (€) Difference (€) 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to 
Lottery B 
(assumes EUT) 
p € p € p € p € 
0.1 2 0.9 1.6  0.1 3.85 0.9 0.1 1.640 0.475 1.17 -∞ -1.71 
0.2 2 0.8 1.6  0.2 3.85 0.8 0.1 1.680 0.850 0.83 -1.71 -0.95 
0.3 2 0.7 1.6  0.3 3.85 0.7 0.1 1.720 1.225 0.50 -0.95 -0.49 
0.4 2 0.6 1.6  0.4 3.85 0.6 0.1 1.760 1.600 0.16 -0.49 -0.15 
0.5 2 0.5 1.6  0.5 3.85 0.5 0.1 1.800 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14 
0.6 2 0.4 1.6  0.6 3.85 0.4 0.1 1.840 2.350 -0.51 0.14 0.41 
0.7 2 0.3 1.6  0.7 3.85 0.3 0.1 1.880 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68 
0.8 2 0.2 1.6  0.8 3.85 0.2 0.1 1.920 3.100 -1.18 0.68 0.97 
0.9 2 0.1 1.6  0.9 3.85 0.1 0.1 1.960 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37 
1 2 0 1.6  1 3.85 0 0.1 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞ 
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not shown to subjects. 
 
The second MPL used in the experiment involved a modification of the H&L task 
to remove non-linear probability weighting as an explanation for the switch between 
options A and B.  Table 3 shows the modified price list used in treatment 2 (treatment 3 
was identical with dollar amounts scaled up by five).  In the modified H&L task, the 
probabilities of all payouts are held constant at 0.5, and as such, choices between lotteries 
                                                            
2 16 out of 100 subjects failed to pass this test concerning comprehension of lotteries and were omitted 
from our sample. 
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cannot be explained by non-linear probability weighting.  We constructed the modified 
H&L task shown in table 3 so that it matched the original H&L task in terms of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) implied by a switch between choosing option 
A and option B.  For example, if an individual switched from choosing option A to option 
B on the sixth row of the original H&L task, it would imply a CRRA between 0.14 and 
0.41. Likewise, in the modified H&L task with constant probabilities, a switch from 
choosing option A to option B on the sixth row would also imply a CRRA between 0.14 
and 0.41.   
 
Table 3. Modified H&L with Constant Payoffs 
Lottery A 
 
Lottery B 
EVA (€) EVB (€) Difference (€) 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to 
Lottery B p € p € p € p € 
0.5 1.68 0.5 1.60  0.5 2.01 0.5 1.00 1.640 1.506 0.13 -∞ -1.71 
0.5 1.76 0.5 1.60  0.5 2.17 0.5 1.00 1.680 1.583 0.10 -1.71 -0.95 
0.5 1.84 0.5 1.60  0.5 2.32 0.5 1.00 1.720 1.658 0.06 -0.95 -0.49 
0.5 1.92 0.5 1.60  0.5 2.48 0.5 1.00 1.760 1.738 0.02 -0.49 -0.15 
0.5 2.00 0.5 1.60  0.5 2.65 0.5 1.00 1.800 1.827 -0.03 -0.15 0.14 
0.5 2.08 0.5 1.60  0.5 2.86 0.5 1.00 1.840 1.932 -0.09 0.14 0.41 
0.5 2.16 0.5 1.60  0.5 3.14 0.5 1.00 1.880 2.068 -0.19 0.41 0.68 
0.5 2.24 0.5 1.60  0.5 3.54 0.5 1.00 1.920 2.272 -0.35 0.68 0.97 
0.5 2.32 0.5 1.60  0.5 4.50 0.5 1.00 1.960 2.748 -0.79 0.97 1.37 
0.5 2.40 0.5 1.60  0.5 4.70 0.5 1.00 2.000 2.852 -0.85 1.37 +∞ 
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not shown to subjects. 
 
For a more robust investigation into the issue, we constructed another MPL that 
modified the original H&L design such that the probability of receiving the higher payout 
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option increased nonlinearly down the list (see table 4).  This task does not remove 
probability weighting as a factor explaining the choices between option A and B, but it is 
constructed so that the switching point is adjusted for the likely fact that individuals 
likely weight probabilities non-linearly.  In particular, we constructed the modified H&L 
task shown in table 4 so that it matched the original H&L task in terms of the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion (CRRA) implied by a switch between choosing option A and 
option B under the assumption that an individual weighted probabilities nonlinearly with 
w(p) = p0.6/[ p0.6 + (1-p)0.6]1/0.6.   
 
Table 4. Modified H&L with Non-Linear Probabilities 
Lottery A 
 
Lottery B 
EVA (€) EVB (€) Difference (€) 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to 
Lottery B 
(assumes 
probability 
weighting) 
p € p € p € p € 
0.03 2.00 0.97 1.60  0.03 3.85 0.97 0.10 1.610 0.194 1.42 -∞ -1.71 
0.09 2.00 0.91 1.60  0.09 3.85 0.91 0.10 1.636 0.439 1.20 -1.71 -0.95 
0.20 2.00 0.80 1.60  0.20 3.85 0.80 0.10 1.678 0.835 0.84 -0.95 -0.49 
0.34 2.00 0.66 1.60  0.34 3.85 0.66 0.10 1.735 1.365 0.37 -0.49 -0.15 
0.50 2.00 0.50 1.60  0.50 3.85 0.50 0.10 1.800 1.975 -0.17 -0.15 0.14 
0.66 2.00 0.34 1.60  0.66 3.85 0.34 0.10 1.865 2.585 -0.72 0.14 0.41 
0.80 2.00 0.20 1.60  0.80 3.85 0.20 0.10 1.922 3.116 -1.19 0.41 0.68 
0.91 2.00 0.09 1.60  0.91 3.85 0.09 0.10 1.964 3.512 -1.55 0.68 0.97 
0.97 2.00 0.03 1.60  0.97 3.85 0.03 0.10 1.990 3.756 -1.77 0.97 1.37 
1.00 2.00 0.00 1.60  1.00 3.85 0.00 0.10 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞ 
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not shown to subjects. 
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Instead of providing a table of choices arrayed in an ordered manner all appearing 
at the same page as in H&L, each choice was presented separately showing probabilities 
and prizes as in Andersen et al. (2011). Subjects could move back and forth between 
screens in a given table but not between tables. Once all ten choices in a table were made, 
the table was effectively inaccessible. The order of appearance of the treatments for each 
subject was completely randomized to avoid order effects (Harrison et al., 2005).  An 
example of one of the decision tasks is shown in figure 1. Because each subject 
completed three MPLs (with 10 choices each) at two payouts, they each made 60 binary 
choices. For each subject, one of the 60 choices was randomly chosen and paid out. 
 
Figure 1.  Example Decision Task  
 
4. Data analysis and results 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of subjects choosing option A over B across the 
three risk preference tasks for small payoff (x1) amounts. Note that all three tasks were 
designed to elicit the same switching point for a given risk aversion coefficient but under 
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new task generated more multiple switching points than the standard H&L task.3  If we 
calculate the number of choices that violate monotonicity, we find that the average 
subject made 0.21 and 0.11 such violations in the original H&L task at low and high 
payouts, respectively.  By contrast, in our modified H&L task with constant probabilities, 
the average subject made 0.85 and 0.69 such violations in the low and high payout tasks, 
respectively.  Over the first few choices in the new decision task, the difference in the 
expected values between lottery options A and B were relatively small, and this might 
partially explain why the constant probability tasks generated more switching behavior.  
However, it should be noted that such small differences in expected values were required 
to generate the same implied CRRA intervals as the original H&L task given the overall 
payout magnitudes. Thus, this is not a feature of our task per se but rather a feature of 
constant relative risk aversion and expected utility theory applied to lotteries with payouts 
of the magnitude considered in the original H&L task but with constant probabilities.  
Importantly, we have analyzed our data removing individuals that significantly violated 
monotonicity (i.e., made three or more inconsistent choices), and our econometric 
estimates (discussed momentarily) are virtually unchanged, suggesting that it is not this 
particular feature of the new task that is driving the differences in implied CRRA across 
tasks.   
Figure 3 illustrates the proportion of subjects choosing option A over B for the 
three tasks that involve higher payoff prizes. As expected, risk aversion increases with 
payoff sizes. The modified constant-probability task initially shows fewer “safe” choices 
than the conventional H&L task, but after the eighth task shows more “safe” choices.  
The issue of monotonicity does not appear as problematic in the modified constant-
probability task when payouts are scaled up.  This might be because the expected value 
differences between options A and B (shown in table 3) are also scaled up by a factor of 
five in this task. 
                                                            
3 In our experiment, we did not impose monotonicity on choices or provide warnings when monotonicity 
was violated. Although such a procedure could be implemented it is unclear if it is superior to simply 
observing how people behave when unconstrained.  
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(3)     
1,2
i j j
j
EU p M U M

   
where  jp M  are the probabilities for each outcome jM  that are induced by the 
experimenter (i.e., columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 in Tables 2, 3 and 4). To explain choices 
between lotteries, we utilize the stochastic specification originally suggested by Fechner 
and popularized by Hey and Orme  (1994). In particular, the following index: 
(4)  B AEU EU EU   
 
is then calculated where AEU  and BEU  refer to expected utilities of options A and B (the 
left and right lottery respectively, as presented to subjects), and where μ is a noise 
parameter that captures decision making errors. The latent index is linked to the observed 
choices using a standard cumulative normal distribution function  EU  , which 
transforms the argument into a probability statement.  We modified equation (2) to 
include Wilcox’s (2011) proposed “contextual utility” specification: 
(5)   /B AEU EU EU c      
In (5), c is a normalizing term, defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in a lottery 
pair minus the minimum utility over all prizes in the same lottery pair. It changes from 
lottery pair to lottery pair, and thus it is said to be contextual. 
     The conditional log-likelihood can then be written as: 
(6)          ln , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1i i
i
L r y EU y EU y         X  
where  1 1iy    denotes the choice of the option B (A) lottery in the risk preference task 
i. Subjects were allowed to express indifference between choices and were told that if 
that choice was selected to be played out, the computer would randomly choose one of 
the two options for them and that both choices had equal chances of being selected. The 
likelihood function for indifferent choices is constructed such that it implies a 50/50 
mixture of the likelihood of choosing either lottery: 
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(7)   
      
    
ln | 1 ln 1 | 1
ln , ; , 1 1ln ln 1 | 0
2 2
i i
i i
EU y EU y
L r y
EU EU y

                        
X  
The parameter r in equation (7) can be allowed to be a linear function of treatment 
variables, namely the three risk aversion tasks as well as the payoff size variable and the 
respective interactions. Equation (7) is maximized using standard numerical methods. 
The statistical specification also takes into account the multiple responses given by the 
same subject and allows for correlation between responses by clustering standard errors, 
which were computed using the delta method. 
 For the original H&L task and the non-linear probability H&L task, we can 
extend the analysis by accounting for probability weighting. Rank Dependent Utility 
(Quiggin, 1982) extends the EUT model by allowing for decision weights on lottery 
outcomes.  To calculate decision weights under RDU, one replaces expected utility in 
equation (3) with: 
(8)          
1,2 1,2
i j j j j
j j
EU w p M U M w U M
 
      
where      2 2 1 1 11w w p p w p w p      and  1 1w w p , with outcomes ranked from 
worst (outcome 2) to best (outcome 1) and  w   is the weighting function.  We assume  
 w  takes the form proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992):  
(9)      11w p p p p        
When 1  , it implies that  w p p  and this serves as a formal test of the hypothesis of 
no probability weighting.    
As with the CRRA parameters, we can condition γ on a vector of treatment variables.  
However, because γ is – by definition – unidentified in the modified constant probability 
H&L task, γ is set to one for these treatments, and these treatment variables do not enter 
the γ function. 
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4.3. Results 
Table 5 shows the estimates of the model when it is assumed that EUT explains 
observed choices (i.e., there is no probability weighting). The constant term, 0.571, 
represents the CRRA for the conventional H&L task at the low-payoff amounts, and it is 
generally consistent with prior estimates of CRRA obtained in other experimental studies.  
Results show that the constant probability H&L task suggests significantly lower CRRA 
(0.687 lower to be precise) for subjects in the x1 Task as compared to the standard H&L 
task. The interaction term Constant prob H&L · x5Task is positive and statistically 
significant, implying that our modified task elicits higher risk aversion than the H&L task 
when lottery prizes are scaled up.  The constant probability task implies slightly risk 
loving preferences in the x1 task (0.571-0.687= -0.116) and risk aversion in the x5 task 
(0.571-0.687+0.027+0.897=0.808), implying increasing relative risk aversion. That the 
x5Task task variable is insignificant suggests the conventional H&L task was invariant to 
scale of payoffs. 
 
Table 5. CRRA estimates assuming EUT 
Estimate Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Constant prob H&L -0.687** 0.214 -1.107 -0.267 
Non-linear prob H&L -0.002 0.063 -0.126 0.121 
x5Task 0.027 0.068 -0.106 0.159 
Constant prob H&L · x5Task 0.897** 0.230 0.447 1.347 
Non-linear prob H&L · x5Task 0.094 0.085 -0.073 0.260 
Constant 0.571** 0.066 0.441 0.701 
  0.249** 0.019 0.211 0.286 
N=5040, Log-pseudolikelihood= -2413.535 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level.  
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 In Table 6, we allow for probability weighting. A Wald test of whether γ = 1 rejects 
the null, implying that probability weighting better characterizes subject’s choices. The 
constant term in the γ function corresponds to the degree of probability weighting for the 
low-payout, conventional H&L task.  Unlike many previous estimates in which γ is 
estimated in the 0.5 to 1.0 range, we find γ = 3.1.  Such an estimate implies significant 
under-weighting of all probabilities.  In our case, we define w(p) as the weight attached to 
the high-payout outcome and 1-w(p) as the weight attached to the low-payout outcome. 
Thus, the results imply people under-weight the likelihood of receiving the high payouts 
and over-weight the likelihood of receiving the low payouts.  Given the magnitude of γ, 
the results imply that unless the probability of receiving the high payout is at least p=0.2, 
it is virtually ignored (i.e., subjects act as if receiving the high payoff was impossible for 
p<0.2 in which case w(p) ≈ 0).  In fact, the results are entirely consistent with an attitude 
of pessimism in that subjects discount the likelihood of receiving the better payout. 
 Although our findings regarding γ, are a bit unusual, they are not totally unrealistic.  
In particular, as shown in figure 4, even at conventional estimates of γ, say γ=0.6, 
individuals also under-weight probabilities at probabilities greater than about 0.35.   
Given that the conventional H&L does not entail choices over very low probability risks 
(i.e., p < 0.05), where heavy over-weighting is thought to exist, it may not be particularly 
well suited to estimate γ, which is another reason to support the use of our modified 
constant probability task.  Nevertheless, we should note that our estimate of γ is 
influenced by modeling choices.  In particular, if we ignore the “contextual utility” 
specification suggested by Wilcox (2011), our estimate of γ in the control condition is 
0.79, which is more similar to previous estimates.  If we keep the “contextual utility” 
specification but instead specify the weighting function, w(p), to apply to the lower 
payoff events (rather than the higher payoff events), the estimate of γ in the control 
condition is 0.82.  Nevertheless, neither of these alternative specifications provide a 
better fit to the data.  They do, however, highlight the challenges in trying to control for 
probability weighting with the conventional H&L task; a task that is unnecessary with 
our new modified task. 
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Figure 4.  Comparison of probability weighting functions for three gamma (g) values 
 The important point is that regardless of the model specification, individuals appear 
to weight probabilities non-linearly; a fact that could produce misleading estimates of 
CRRA in the traditional H&L task.  Moreover, with all specifications we have 
considered, when one accounts for such probability weighting, the estimate of the CRRA 
in the traditional H&L task falls related to the EUT specification that assumes linear 
probability weighting.    
 Table 6 also reports the effects of the various treatment combinations on the CRRA.  
Note that the estimated constant is 0.009, implying that the H&L task elicits 
approximately risk neutral preferences under RDU. The Constant prob H&L · x5Task 
interaction term is significant and positive implying risk averse behavior in the modified 
HL when we scale up payoffs. The Non-linear prob H&L · x5Task is also statistically 
significant which implies that risk aversion increases in the non-linear probability H&L 
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task along with payoff prizes, although the magnitude of increasing relative risk aversion 
is far less than that implied by the constant-probability task. 
 
Table 6. CRRA and probability weighting function curvature estimates 
Estimate Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
r     
   Constant prob H&L -0.197 0.247 -0.681 0.288 
   Non-linear prob H&L 0.088 0.133 -0.173 0.349 
   x5Task -0.064 0.105 -0.270 0.143 
   Constant prob H&L · x5Task 1.076** 0.274 0.540 1.612 
   Non-linear prob H&L · x5Task 0.290* 0.173 -0.049 0.629 
   Constant 0.009 0.106 -0.200 0.218 
      
   Non-linear prob H&L 0.141 0.496 -0.830 1.113 
   x5Task 0.390 0.379 -0.353 1.133 
   Non-linear prob H&L · x5Task -0.828 0.596 -1.997 0.340 
   Constant 3.116** 0.374 2.383 3.848 
   0.278** 0.015 0.248 0.307 
N=5040, Log-pseudolikelihood= -2368.143 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level.  
 
To flesh out the implications of our findings, Table 7 shows predicted mean 
CRRA’s and confidence intervals (implied by the models in tables 5 and 6) by treatment 
under the assumptions of EUT and RDU. As expected, and by construction, our constant 
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probability task generates virtually identical estimates of CRRA regardless of whether 
EUT or RDU is assumed.  In the constant probability task, the estimated CRRA implies 
risk neutrality for low payoffs and risk aversion for higher payoffs, r =0.81.   
 
Table 7. Predicted Coefficients of Relative Risk Aversion by Treatment 
  x1 Task x5 Task 
  CRRA 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
RRA 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
H&L 
EUT 0.571 0.441 0.701 0.598 0.457 0.738 
RDU 0.009 -0.200 0.218 -0.055 -0.283 0.174 
Constant 
prob H&L 
EUT -0.116 -0.535 0.302 0.807 0.533 1.081 
RDU -0.188 -0.641 0.265 0.825 0.525 1.125 
Non-linear 
prob H&L 
EUT 0.569 0.408 0.729 0.689 0.545 0.833 
RDU 0.097 -0.160 0.355 0.324 0.111 0.536 
 
Table 7 reveals that without accounting for non-linear probability weighting, the 
conventional H&L task implies risk aversion, r = 0.57.  It is only when one estimates a 
RDU model that risk neutrality is implied – a finding which matches with our constant 
probability task.  The conventional H&L task suggests constant CRRA across low and 
high-payouts, however, our constant probability task implies increasing relative risk 
aversion.  The non-linear probability H&L task shows falls between these two with 
evidence of slightly increasing relative risk aversion. 
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5. Conclusions 
Although H&L introduced a useful tool for characterizing risk taking behavior, their 
approach is not able to identify why a particular behavior under risk was observed.  Risk 
averse behavior could result from curvature of the utility function, curvature of the 
probability weighting function, or both.  The obvious implication is that caution should 
be taken in directly using behavior from H&L’s risk preference elicitation method to 
infer curvature of the utility function, the theoretical concept that is often of interest, 
because risk averse behavior may be driven by probability weighting.        
 We introduced a modified version of the H&L task which, by construction, rules 
out probability weighting as a driver of lottery choice.  At low payoff amounts, we find 
approximate risk neutral behavior in our new task – a finding only implied by the 
conventional H&L task after an econometric model allowing for probability weighting is 
fit to the conventional H&L data.  At high payoff amounts, we find significant levels of 
risk aversion in our modified decision task, with an estimate of the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion of about 0.8. However, once one accounts for non-linear probability 
weighting via an econometric model, the conventional H&L task suggests approximate 
risk neutral preferences at high payouts.   
 The advantage of the experimental approach is the ability to isolate the causal 
effects of factors of interest.  Our new approach allows one to isolate the effects of key 
variables, such as the scale of payoffs, on the curvature of the utility function without 
having to make any assumptions about the extent to which people weight probabilities 
non-linearly.   
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